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Abstract
Drawing Borders: The Political and Symbolic Importance of the United States in
the Creation of Czechoslovakia

by Samantha Borgeson
In 2011, a statue of Woodrow Wilson, based on the original erected in
1928, was re-installed at Woodrow Wilson Train Station in the capital of the
Czech Republic. The original statue commemorated Wilson's involvement in the
creation of interwar Czechoslovakia, and his support for its independence. It
also symbolized the democratic ideals which brought the two nations together
following the Great War. Woodrow Wilson played a major part in the history and
memory of Czechs during their formative years of their state following World War
I, a role which has not been forgotten. Today the Wilson statue is the site of
ongoing political and national memory construction revealing the multi-layered
aspects of Czech national identity and politics.
There are three main components to the Czech-American relationship:
the importance of the Czech argument of historic right to land, the role of
Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in the United States in pressuring the Wilson
Administration, and Wilson’s worldview and idea of national self-determination
Often interdependent, these three themes help explain the dual founding
fathers myth of Czechoslovakia of Wilson and Masaryk, as well as the
importance of this relationship in the present.
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Introduction: Wilson’s Influence and Memory

In 2011, a statue of Woodrow Wilson, based on the original erected in
1928, was re-installed at Woodrow Wilson Train Station in the capital of the
Czech Republic. The original statue commemorated Wilson's involvement in the
creation of interwar Czechoslovakia, and his support for its independence. It
also symbolized the democratic ideals which brought the two nations together
following the Great War. After the Czech state ceased to exist in 1939, the
National Socialists occupation government led by Reinhard Heydrich destroyed
the statue on December 12th, 1941. Revealing the importance of the restoration
of Wilson's statue in Prague, a Czech citizen declared, “Bringing President Wilson
back to Central Europe is historic, and symbolic. It underscores the ‘rule of law’
and the Western style of democracy that started in 1918 in this part of the
world.”1 This sentiment demonstrates that the symbol of Wilson continues to
resonate throughout Czech society today. Indeed, throughout the new Czech
Republic, there are numerous monuments, streets, train stations, and squares
named after the American president.

Woodrow Wilson played a major part in

the history and memory of Czechs during their formative years of their state
1

Eileen Daday, “Local Czechs Proud of Wilson Statue,” The Daily Herald, October 8, 2011.
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following World War I, a role which has not been forgotten. Today the Wilson
statue is the site of ongoing political and national memory construction
revealing the multi-layered aspects of Czech national identity and politics. An
examination of the bond between Wilson and the Czechs reveals not only the
deep connection between the former Czechoslovakia, the United States, and its
former president to Czech history and identity but how these sites of memory
continue to impact Czech foreign relations strategies and the special
relationship between the United States and the Czech Republic.
At the end of World War I the Habsburg Monarchy, which had ruled
various parts of Europe for over 600 years, disintegrated and in the aftermath
numerous different ethnic groups struggled to create and maintain successorstates.

The champion of one of these states, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk of

Czechoslovakia and later its first president, worked tirelessly during World War I to
achieve recognition of this new state and support from the Allied powers. The
success of his goals for independence and security of specific borders hinged
on both President Woodrow Wilson of the United States and fervent support from
Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in America. Masaryk’s realization of an
independent homeland was contingent on the interlocking doctrines of
Wilson’s principles of self-determination and democracy and Masaryk’s
argument of historic and ethnic rights for the creation of a Czechoslovak state
as well as the influence of immigrant groups in the United States.
2

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, several
emerging nations employed history to legitimize border and statehood claims.
Czechs employed an argument of historic right, among others, in order to
establish (or re-establish according to this argument), a state with certain
borders and on this basis they petitioned the Allied powers, including the United
States, to accomplish this goal.

Woodrow Wilson’s policy of national self-

determination largely legitimized this argument of historic right, and gave
Central European nations an international platform from which to justify their
border and statehood claims.

The manipulation of the historical record to

enhance one ethnic group over another led to unique characteristics in the
emergence of new Central European states after 1919.

Some of these

characteristics include continuing to manipulate history in order to achieve state
goals in the present as well as history playing a role in governmental policy
decisions. The continuing importance of Wilson to the Czech Republic is a case
in point.
The influence of immigrants in the United States on American foreign
policy and in the realization of Czechoslovak statehood in 1918 underpinned
Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination and overt support of the formation of a
Czechoslovakian state.

These immigrants continued to support their former

homelands by forming civil society groups and lobbying President Wilson on
behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence.

Immigrant groups played an
3

important role in the early twentieth century and continue to influence United
States foreign policy today.
Along with President Wilson’s support and the impact of the immigrant
Czech-Slovak immigrant societies, ties between the two countries were also
forged on a more personal basis. Tomáš Masaryk’s wife was from Brooklyn and
he was a personal friend of Charles Crane, a wealthy American businessman,
former diplomat and staunch supporter of Woodrow Wilson.

These political,

societal, and personal ties proved to be the beginning of a long-term
connection between the Czechs and Americans, kept alive by a celebration of
shared democratic principles as well as by the immigrant heritage. Many cities
in the United States still retain a large number of self-conscious Bohemian and
Moravian Czech descendants. In addition, some still maintain close ties with the
Czech Republic. As recently as 2013, the Czech government gave the town of
West, Texas, comprised of nearly 75% Czech descendants, $200,000 in order to
rebuild its local sokol, or gymnasium, destroyed in a fertilizer plant explosion.
The explosion caught the attention of the Czech Republic and was all over
Czech news stations at the time.

That the Czech government decided to

donate this money to West represents importance of former immigrants to the
Czech Republic as a means to continue nurturing good relations with the United
States and with its former people.

4

Let me add here a few definitions for the sake of simplicity and continuity.
Throughout the thesis, I use the term “Bohemian lands” to discuss the ethnically
diverse region which includes Bohemia and Moravia; basically, the boundaries
of today’s Czech Republic which encompasses almost the same territory as a
tenth-century Bohemia. The term Czecho-Slovak is used to discuss shared war
aims before statehood, whereas Czechoslovakia refers to the state which
existed from 1918 to 1993, excluding the time during the years of the Second
World War when that state was divided, partitioned, and occupied by Nazi
Germany and its allies.
Although a discussion of the Carpathian Rus or developments in Slovakia
(aside from explaining how the Czechs framed the argument justifying the
inclusion of Slovakia in a larger Czechoslovak state after World War I) will not be
included in my discussion, this is not meant to diminish or marginalize their
historical importance; they are topics best covered in another work. In Slovakia
in particular, the region had a separate and distinct set of historical
circumstances which do not fit into the crafted Bohemian historical narrative;
consequently, the border disputes between Czechoslovakia and Hungary will
be omitted.
There was a hope that a common Czecho-Slovak identity would
eventually emerge.

However, both nationalism and conflicting interests

prevented the two sides from coming to terms and eventually the country broke
5

apart in 1993.2 Czech nationalists had a Czechoslovak vision for the new state,
and Slovak nationalists wanted exclusive home rule and independent
government structures in their part of the new country. To some extent, Slovaks
did attain home rule; however, Czech nationals emerged victorious when
reforms encouraged common national identity among Czechs and Slovaks
during the First Republic of Czechoslovakia (1918-1938).

This difference of

opinion on the new government caused deep divisions amongst leaders of the
two groups which eventually led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia.3
There are three main components to the Czech-American relationship
which can help explain the influence and impact of the United States in the
founding of Czechoslovakia. The first theme is the importance of the Czech
argument of historic right to land to convince the United States on the validity of
Bohemian "historic nationhood." The second component to understanding early
US-Czech relations is the Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in the United
States and their role in pressuring the Wilson Administration.

Finally, Wilson’s

worldview on national self-determination that developed in the context of the
violence and destruction of the Great War represents a key theme in
uncovering US support for the Czechoslovak state. Often interdependent, these
2

On Czech-Slovak relations, see Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation

Versus State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
3

Robert Henry Cox and Erich G. Frankland, “The Federal State and the Breakup of

Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis,” Publius 25, no 1 (Winter, 1995), 75-76.
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three themes help explain the dual founding fathers myth of Czechoslovakia of
Wilson and Masaryk, as well as the importance of this relationship in the present.
Chapter One examines the first theme by exploring the Czech argument
of historic right to contested land during and after World War I. This argument
was fundamental in convincing Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders to
support the Czechs in their bid for independence and their claim for specific
borders. More importantly these historical arguments were fundamental to the
formation of Czech nation-state ideology. With the impending fall of the AustroHungarian Empire the Czechs looked to the past, and specifically to the
medieval and early modern Bohemian past, in order to legitimize their claims
and assert political power. This chapter explores why these Czech nationalists
looked to medieval and early modern history to uncover the arguments
employed in 1919 to foster support for Czech statehood as it also delegitimized
Habsburg claims. During World War I, Czech nationalists, who attempted to
establish home rule under the Habsburg Empire in order to secure language
rights

began

to

utilize

historic

Bohemia

to

establish

an

independent

Czechoslovakia in the post-war world.
Throughout Bohemia’s long tenure within the Austrian Habsburg Empire,
few people living in the Bohemian lands considered themselves distinctively
“Czech” or had any conception of the boundaries of a Czech nation. Even

7

during the last years of the Habsburg rule leading up to World War I, few
intellectuals actively sought independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire;
rather, most simply wanted autonomy and language rights under the current
monarchy.

The outbreak of World War I shifted the status quo as these Czech

nationalists, who had previously argued for Czech language rights, used the
same justifications based on their distinct language and history in order to
establish an independent state.

Consequently these intellectuals created a

historicized myth of Czechoslovakia, utilizing historical arguments that had been
created during the last century in order to establish a direct link between an
emerging historic Czech nation to a distant Czech-Bohemian past.4
These historical claims, however mythologized, helped establish and
legitimize Czechoslovakia, and persist to the present as an integral part of
Czech identity.

They are therefore essential to understanding the heated

border disputes between Czechoslovakia and its neighbors following the end of
the Great War. In addition, these historical claims, and resulting myths, are
crucial to understanding why the idea of Czech historic rights meshed so well
with Wilson’s principle of self-determination.

This mythology provided the

impetus for demanding recognition of land which Czech nationalists claimed as
“historic” and traditionally “Czech.”
4

See Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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The Czechs used the historic right argument in creating (or “recreating”)
and legitimizing former Czechoslovakia from 1914 until 1939.

Central to

understanding this use of history and language is an examination of why the
Czechs used medieval history to legitimize their claims and why this argument
was effective. Also essential to understanding this process is the role of the
Czech “nationalists,” and how the situation after World War I required their
employment of historical “myth” in order to prove legitimacy and achieve
independence.

These nationalists are not static and constantly change

depending on the domestic and international situation.
Chapter Two explores the question of how Czech and Slovak immigrant
groups impacted the relationship between the United States and what would
become an independent Czechoslovakia. Though historical myth provided the
rhetoric, Czech and Slovak immigrant groups provided the muscle by lobbying
the United States government to help their former homelands achieve
independence.

These connections played no small part in helping endear

Wilson to Masaryk and garner support for the independence cause. These and
other Czech-formed civil society associations continue, to the present day, to
promote good relations between the Czech Republic and the United States.
For example, the American Friends of the Czech Republic is the Czech
immigrant group in the United States which commissioned and funded (mostly)

9

the 2011 Wilson statue in Prague. Coupled with the close personal ties of the
Czechoslovakian founding father to America, these immigrant groups played a
significant role in the formation of an independent Czechoslovakia.
Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Wilson Administration and World War I
as it unfolds to answer the question of why Wilson chose to support the Czechs
and Slovaks in their bid for independence. What changed to make Wilson go
from not wanting to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire to supporting and
speaking in support of an independent country of Czechoslovakia? Part of this
change in attitude had to do with Wilson’s ideas of what the world should look
like; one component of his worldview was self-determination.
Wilson’s policy of self-determination raised the hopes of the Czechs who,
after the outbreak of World War I, began to lobby for independence of the
historic lands of Bohemia and Moravia. The reality of the situation, however,
proved to be more complicated than Wilson’s immediate and blanket approval
for Czech independence. Over time, Wilson’s attitude toward the dissolution of
Austria-Hungary and establishment of Czechoslovakia changed and adapted
to events as they evolved during the course of the war and in the course of the
Paris Peace Conference. The problems with true self-determination became
evident during the Těšín border dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland as

10

well with the Sudeten German question, in which the Allied powers realized the
complexities of the multinational East Central European region.5
These three themes intertwine to create the myth of the creation of
Czechoslovakia which can be seen in the Wilson statue in Prague. Therefore,
Chapter Four examines the meaning and intent behind the Wilson Statue as a
site of memory, and what narrative of the past this monument represents. If the
Wilson statue, and other memory sites constructed in the 1920s, served to
underscore

the

close

relationship

shared

by

the

United

States

and

Czechoslovakia and commemorate Czechoslovakian independence, they also
legitimized the power of the new ruling elite. Serving as a political tool to bind
two nations together based on shared democratic values and historical
circumstances, the monument also illustrates a specific place in time where
historical events made the need to create the memory site a political
imperative.
Consequently, the memory and legacy of Woodrow Wilson lives on
today and can be seen through cooperation between the Czech Republic and
the United States. The Czechs truly haven’t forgotten about the role the United
States played in the creation and independence of their country. Moreover,
United States citizens of Czech descent have not forgotten about their ancestral
Margaret Macmillan goes into detail in the Těšín border issue between Czechoslovakia and
Poland in Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War
5

(London: John Murray, 2001).
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homeland.

The historic relationship between these two countries plays an

important role in their foreign relations to this day. Wilson’s principles of selfdetermination continue to impact present political developments and persistent
historical memory.

Thus, the statue of Wilson perpetuates the myth of the

creation of Czechoslovakia and the myth of Wilson in the Czech Republic itself.
It also presents the Czech Republic as a distinctly Western state by tying
President Wilson and President Masaryk together as dual founding-fathers of
Czechoslovakia. This myth is reinforced by both the Czech government and
immigrant groups in the United States in the creation and support of this site of
memory, the Woodrow Wilson statue in Prague.

12

Chapter 1
Legitimization of Historic Right in the Czech lands

In order to first understand the importance of Woodrow Wilson to the
Czechs, it is crucial to understand Czech national rhetoric at the outbreak of
World War I.

Then it is possible to understand how the Czechs’ political

argument of historic right to lands and independence meshed with Wilson’s
principle of self-determination.

As a result, Wilson as champion of Czech

independence became integrated into the larger Czech national mythology.
As will be evident in subsequent chapters, however, it took Wilson a long time to
get on board with the idea of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and with Czech
independence.
Alexei Miller argues in Historical Policy: Eastern Europe Convolutions in the
21st Century, that historic policy, also known as “the broad use of history for
political purposes,” is a twenty-first century phenomenon.

However, there is

evidence of the Czechs using this exact type of historical discourse in order to
achieve political goals, namely independence from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire after the outbreak of World War I.

Miller states that it is difficult to

“explain the sharp intensification in historical policy in the 2000s.” Yet, it is quite
simple when you look at the Czech nationalists, who under the Habsburgs
13

began to look to medieval history in order to first create a cultural and linguistic
identity; and later a political-national identity in order to justify border claims to
the Allied governments after using this policy to gain independence.6
Anthony Smith explains in his article “States and Homelands: the Social
and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory,” that “to a nationalist, the
national territory belongs to a nation by historic right, as a possession of his
forefathers for many generations and a repository of sacred memories.”7 He
further argues in National Identity that there are certain “fundamental features
of national identity” and the first two he lists are “an historic territory, or
homeland,” and “common myths and historical memories.”8

Consequently,

these are the two main features of Czech national identity formation in the
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries.
In “Historical Rights: The Evaluation of Nationalists Claims to Sovereignty,”
Chaim Gans distinguishes between two types of historic rights: chronologically
based and value based. Chronologically based historic right states that if an
ethnic or religious group has a right to a land if they were the first to inhabit it.
Value based historic right explains that a group has a right to particular land if it
6

Alexei Miller, “Historical Policy: Eastern European Convolutions in the 21st Century,” Russia in

Global Affairs 4 (2011), accessed January 2, 2012, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/AChallenge-from-the-Past-15431.
7

Anthony D. Smith, “States and Homelands: the Social and Geopolitical Implications of National

Territory,” Millennium, Journal of International Studies 10, no. 3 (January 1981), 187-202.
8

Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14.
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is of “primary importance in forming the historical identity.”9

The Czech

nationalists actually used both of Gans’ types of historic right in order to
legitimize their land and independence claims. They argued that Czechs first
inhabited the historic lands of Bohemia and also that Czech identity was tied to
that land.

Why Medieval and Early Modern History?
Though the different nationalities that made up the former AustroHungarian Empire wished for greater autonomy within the empire, their desires
only came to fruition with independence after World War I and only took place
due to Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination and western support.
Thus Czech nationalists had to underscore a history in which their lands were not
ruled by the Habsburgs in order to justify the right to exist as a state. Therefore,
looking back to medieval, and to some extent early modern, history became
commonplace in Central and Eastern Europe, especially for the newly formed
Czechoslovakia.
Bohemia was the Habsburg Empire’s wealthiest kingdom due to the rich
soil, strategic location, textile industry, mineral industry, and large population.

9

Chaim Gans, “The Evaluation of Nationalist Claims to Sovereignty,” Political Theory 29, no.1

(February 2001), 58-60.
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Therefore, the Habsburg Monarchy was content to let the Bohemians enjoy
greater autonomy within the Empire.10 This autonomy was all but stripped away
by Ferdinand II after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 when he brought in
foreign nobles to replace the rebellious Bohemian ones. Therefore, Bohemian’s
nobles were replaced by a group that was German, at least in language, and
loyal to the Austrians.11 These nobles remained fiercely noble to the Austrian
Empire after the Counter-Reformation, so they were then angered when, in
1867, the Austrian Empire was reorganized into the Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary.

In other words, Hungary gained equal status with Austria while

Bohemia, now loyal in addition to being the most industrialized and richest part
of the Empire, did not.
During the late Habsburg Empire, Czech nationals seeking an equal
place for the Bohemian lands as Hungarians within the Empire had already
begun the process of looking to the past for language and ethnic legitimacy
within the Empire; therefore, it became easier to create a national identity for
Czechs. In fact, “some people from the region consider the Middle Ages to be
the high point in their national historical traditions.”12 This historic Czech myth,

10

Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2000), 10-12.
11 Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 85.
12

Johnson, Central Europe, 26.
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already having been created by nineteenth-century nationalists, became the
foundation of legitimacy for the new Czech nation.
Czechs also used medieval and early modern history in order to show how
foreign subjugation had unlawfully stolen their statehood. Events such as the
murder of Jan Hus and the Battle of White Mountain were used to propagate
the idea that Czechs had been treated unfairly and deserved the restoration of
state independence on their historic lands.13
Czech nationalists used three main foundational events or people in order
to establish a national myth and link the present with the past. While this is not
an exhaustive list, these three show up the most when nationalists later utilized
the medieval and early modern past: Jan Hus, Jan Žižka, and the Battle of White
Mountain. Jan Hus (1369-1415), a Bohemian priest, is considered a forerunner of
the Protestant Reformation about one hundred years prior to Martin Luther. Hus

On Czech medieval history, see Lisa Wolverton, trans., Cosmas of Prague: The Chronicle of the
Czechs (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009); Hugh LeCaine Agnew,
The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2004); Hans
13

Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979); Johnson, Central Europe; John M. Klassen, Warring Maidens, Captive
Wives, and Hussite Queens: Women and Men at War and at Peace in Fifteenth Century Bohemia
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The
Meanings of Its History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Jaroslav Panek and Oldrich
Tuma Et Alii, A History of the Czech Lands (Prague: Charles University Press, 2009); Derek Sayer,
The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Mikulas
Teich, ed., Bohemia in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); C.V. Wedgwood,
The Thirty Years War (New York: Methuen & Co., 1987); Lisa Wolverton, Hastening Toward Prague:
Power and Society in the Medieval Czech Lands (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2001).
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wanted to reform the Church and became popular within Bohemia as a result
of his sermons in the Czech language, as opposed to Latin. However, after
being accused of heresy and summoned to the Council of Konstanz on the
assurances of safety by Emperor Sigismund, he ended up burning at the stake
which was later deemed a “national insult” to the Bohemian lands.14

Thus

began the Hussite revolution as Hus’s followers began to resist Church and
imperial power, eventually with arms.
Jan Žižka(1360-1424), the one-eyed leader of the Hussite peasant armies,
also became a national hero and mythological figure in the Czech national
narrative. This occurred mostly because he was able to lead peasants with
simple weapons into battle against superior imperial armies and win multiple
times. In fact, he forced Emperor Sigismund’s army to withdraw from part of
Bohemia and then defeated them.15

Thus, “heroic images of Czech unity

against all were to be recalled in the nineteenth century as a source of national
pride.”16
Finally, the Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620) became a symbol
of national tragedy and subjugation for later Czechs. Two years prior, the Thirty
Years’ War began as a result of tensions between the Catholic Austrian Empire
14
15

Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia, 37.
Hugh Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover Institution

Press, 2004), 46.
16

Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia, 39.
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and the Protestant Bohemian nobles that culminated in the defenestration of
Prague. Ferdinand II defeated the Bohemian nobles, who had rebelled against
Ferdinand’s counter-reformation policies, and beheaded numerous nobles.
Their heads were exhibited on the Charles Bridge for 10 years. This resulted in the
victory of the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the effective subjugation of
the Bohemian nobility. Ferdinand invited nobles who would be loyal to him to
take over land in Bohemia; however, these new nobles came from all over
Europe.

To complete this conquest, Ferdinand not only made German equal

to Czech as an official language of Bohemia, but also placed education under
Catholic Jesuit control. Also, as a result of the human devastation of the Thirty
Years’ War, the region suffered depopulation and as a result, Germans speaking
workers began to migrate into the Bohemian lands from the German-speaking
states of the Holy Roman Empire.

After 1620, the Kingdom of Bohemia which

continued to exist within the Austrian Empire was the residue of the much larger
Bohemian Kingdom established in the fourteenth century.17
As historian Derek Sayer contends, “This modern nation is not so much
rooted in that medieval experience as retrospectively reconstructed out of it.”18
Thus, in order to understand the use of history and language during the AustroHungarian Empire and beyond, it is imperative to understand the national
17

Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 38-39.

18

Sayer, Coasts of Bohemia, 52.

19

awakening led by Czech nationalists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
which constructed a national myth and identity from this history and coincided
with the reemergence of the Czech language.
National Awakening & Czech Nationalists
The role of Czech language in establishing the Czechoslovak state cannot
be understated.

Historians have thoroughly examined how the Czech

language, revived during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became a
tool used by Czech nationals within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to
establish linguistic rights.19 People living within Bohemia and Moravia prior to the
twentieth-century, however, had much more flexible ideas about language,
speaking both German and Czech depending upon the social or economic
situation.

In addition, inhabitants of Bohemia were bilingual depending on

vocation or social status. Therefore, Czech nationals had to establish a usable
Czech language and expand its vocabulary since it had remained a peasant
language despite not being used in the cities for so long.
After the Battle of White Mountain, Habsburg rulers began a long practice
of suppressing the local languages and elevating German in the government
and education systems in Bohemia as a means to bring the richest area of their
19 On Czech language revival, see Hugh LeCaine Agnew, Origins of the Czech National
Renascence (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); and Peter Brock and H Gordon

Skilling, eds., The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1970).
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empire under control. Another goal in implementing this type of reform was to
modernize and create a uniform language for administration throughout the
Habsburg lands, and also to end repression throughout the Habsburg Empire.
However, instead of simply creating an efficient administrative system, these
reforms generated regional tensions as affected nobles began to rebel against
what they saw as heavy-handed reforms to the status quo. The new reforms
specifically targeted non-German-speakers and put them at a disadvantage in
what became a forced “Germanization” of the Bohemian lands. Therefore, the
Czech language became the focal point of dissent and the preservation of
national identity became paramount. The only problem was that Czech was a
regional dialect spoken in the Bohemian and Moravian countryside as a result of
these language laws.
Maria Theresa and Joseph II, both Habsburg rulers, implemented
enlightened reforms which, among other things, stipulated the use of one official
language throughout the Empire, German which then turned the language
issue into a political issue.20 However, they began to promote learning local
languages, such as Czech, in schools.21 This wasn’t a problem for the Czechs
because they had to learn German in school already as a result of the reforms
made after the Battle of White Mountain. Yet, Germans knew very little, if any,
20
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Czech, which caused German-speaking “Ultra-Germans” to protest on behalf of
German language rights thus exacerbating an already growing issue between
the Czech-speaking nationalists and the German-speaking nationalists in the
Bohemian crownlands.22 In response to the rhetoric of these “Ultra-Germans,” a
new intellectual elite was born in the Bohemian lands which became known as
the Czech national “awakeners” who began to “revive” Czech language as
well as culture to counter the growing pressure of German language and
culture in the Bohemian lands.
National literature and the Czech language had to be revived in order to
create some sort of national community.

Therefore, in the 1800s, Josef

Dobrovsky, Josef Jungmann, Jan Kollar, Pavel Josef Safarik, and Frantisek
Palacky all expanded the Czech vocabulary and integrated it into different
types of national visions and rhetoric. Ultimately, all these visions, goals, and
developments led to the reemergence of a language which could compete
with German in Bohemia by the late nineteenth-century.23 Masaryk later stated
that by placing so much emphasis upon linguistic rebirth, [Czechs] became a

22 For a specific instance of these tensions in one region of Bohemia and the German-Czech
nationalists issues which followed in Budweiser, see Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and
Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002)
23 For more on the development of Czech language and literature and the competing national
visions, see David L Cooper, “Competing Languages of Czech Nation-Building: Jan Kollar and

the Melodiousness of Czech,” Slavic Review 67, no. 2 (2008): 301-320.
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‘philological’ nation.”24 This culminated in the creation of Czech dictionaries,
folk songs, cookbooks, almanacs, textbooks, etc.
Eventually, these linguistic struggles took on a deliberately political
dimension as Czech national “awakeners” began to compete with Germanspeakers within the Bohemian lands for linguistic dominance. Czech linguistic
nationalism also became intertwined with historical arguments thus creating
part of the eventual myth of Czechoslovakia.

Masaryk argued that as an

“awakener,” Dobrovsky (1723-1829), a Czech scholar who is credited with the
Czech national revival, came from the long tradition of the Czech reformation.
This national awakening escalated in the 1860s with industrialization as
Czech-speakers began to move from the countryside to cities for work which
challenged the traditional “language borders” separating the Germanspeaking city inhabitants and the Czech-speaking rural inhabitants.25 As this
movement to the cities greatly increased the number of Czech-speakers in what
had previously been predominantly German-speaking urban centers, the
balance of power shifted and more Czech nationals began to participate in
municipal politics. Therefore, the use of history in Czech politics began with the
revival of Czech language and culture.
24
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Eventually, medieval history also came to be used and altered to fit the
national narrative during the national awakening.

The Czech nationalists’

primary goal was to gain more autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and establish a federalized state where Prague would have as much autonomy
as Vienna and Budapest. However, they had to establish legitimacy in the eyes
of Austria in order to attempt to attain the same status as Hungary.

The

widespread use of history in this region gained momentum under Habsburg rule
when Czech nationalists were trying to establish more autonomy and construct
a national identity.

Thus, nationalists constructed a Czech national identity

around the Czech language and the medieval Bohemian past. As Derek Sayer
points out in The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History, “history itself, in the guise
of a recovered memory, was to become a crucial ingredient in the very clear
‘consciousness of national identity’ that did crystallize among Czechs in the later
nineteenth century.”26
What these intellectuals needed to accomplish was to create what
Benedict Anderson called “an imagined political community” where its
members could feel united even if they had never met.27

However, in

Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the
Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948, Tara Zahra contends that studies of nations
26
27
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specifically as imagined communities “may have inadvertently exaggerated
the universality and transparency of nationalist loyalties.”28 As many scholars
have pointed out, national loyalty in the Bohemian lands proved to be a more
complicated reality where people living in Bohemia spoke multiple languages
and didn’t identify with a particular ethnicity.29
Several historians focus on the emergence of Czech national identity in
the nineteenth century; however, this was not the first time that Czechs had
expressed their national identity. In fact, Czech intellectuals, politicians, and
nobles had argued for the preservation of their language within the Habsburg
Empire after the Thirty Years’ War.30 Even earlier still, in the 12th century, Cosmas
of Prague sought “to define the Czechs as a nation through history, compel
them to think about their political culture, and urge reform, justice, and
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responsibility.”31 His work became the foundation stone for the Czech historical
myth which emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
In addition to what the Czechs began to construct as their glorious history,
events such as The Battle of White Mountain and the burning of Jan Hus at the
stake became symbols for national tragedy, martyrdom and subjugation to a
foreign power. According to Lonnie Johnson, “The concept of nationalism had
to be retrospectively articulated in terms of people’s ‘ancient’ freedoms, which
had been violated” or “lost in the past” and “had to be regained or
reestablished in the future,” even if it was easier to look back to a distinguished
and idealized medieval history than the “intervening histories of foreign
subjugation, regardless of how long they may have lasted.”32

Thus, Czech

nationals who wanted either autonomy within or freedom from the AustroHungarian Empire actively linked the past to the present. For example, in a
speech in 1910, Masaryk linked the Czech national revival of the eighteenth
century to the Hussite reformation in order to provide a historical continuity basis
for the current political struggle against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This

historical narrative, however, did not leave room for any other victims of history
within the Bohemian lands; it also created the necessary perpetrator or villain for

Wolverton, Cosmas, 3. While some argue that Cosmas’ account is biased, this is the first
attempt to chronicle the history of the Czechs and evaluate power in medieval society, which
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the nation to rally against, the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia.
The power behind this cultural production of history by Masaryk and others
gains credibility as it is based in facts. The Habsburgs, specifically Ferdinand II,
completely subordinated and then “Germanized” the nobility of the Kingdom of
Bohemia during the Counter-Reformation in such a way as to render it
incapable of resistance in the future. The culminating battle in this conflict, the
Battle of White Mountain, is arguably “a crucial concept in the raising of Czech
national consciousness in the nineteenth century;” however, “it continued to
have a nationalist connotation in Czech politics long into the twentieth
century.”33

White Mountain can be viewed as the beginning of German

oppression which culminated in the expulsion of Germans after World War II.
Conversely, there was a history of coexistence that Czechs and Germans had
before the rise of modern nationalism. Germans were invited and welcomed
into Bohemia to work prior to this time period and were seen as meaningful to
society and culture. Either way, Battle of White Mountain was a turning point in
Czech-German relations, part of the myth of Czechoslovakia, which culminated
in the eventual expulsion of Germans from Bohemian lands.
By the late nineteenth-century, Czech and German nationalists began to
use language as a measure of nationality. In the Bohemian lands, the only real
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or tangible difference between Germans and Czechs was language.

Thus

language became the battleground for nationality politics. Czech and German
nationalists alike were faced with a fundamental problem. A vast majority of
individuals living within the Bohemian lands remained indifferent to nationalism,
nationalist appeals, and politics.

Attempts at “conversion” on the basis of

language was largely met with indifference and disinterest from both German
and Czech speakers. Zahra argues that this indifference to nationalism was
ultimately the driving force behind escalating nationalist tensions and battles
over nationality.34

Moreover, families viewed bilingualism as a benefit and

made sure their children knew both Czech and German. Thus, the battle over
these “hermaphrodites,” or bilingual children, ensued, each side trying to gain
linguistic converts.35 While this was largely a Czech versus German problem, it
created a political climate through its rhetoric which was toxic to anyone
categorized as “other’ or outside the nationality. It also propagated the idea of
Bohemian lands specifically for Czech speakers which meant no more tolerance
for bilingualism and plurality of ethnic groups.
The Czech nationalists also began to frame their argument for greater
autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s existing framework on the basis
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of historic right. The principle of historical right “tried to prove that the Czech
state

had

never

ceased

to

exist

legally;”

thus,

“constitutional

independence…had never been legally interrupted.”36 It became an avenue
through which Czech nationalists could attempt to reassert a number of
constitutional rights of the previous Bohemian Kingdom. Originally among the
national awakeners, no vision of an independent state existed as these
nationalists mainly wanted greater autonomy within the empire, much like that
enjoyed by Hungary after 1862. Nationalists began to call for a tri-monarchy
together with Austria and Hungary on the basis of the historic right of the
Bohemian crown. In addition, the use of historic right of the Bohemian crown
“did not correspond to ethnographic facts, but it was applicable as an effective
political oversimplification.”37 Thus this principle sought to establish a political
and territorial entity as opposed to a national one within the Bohemian lands
which is important because then the economically rich and developed territory
would not have to be divided into Czech and German parts.
Another concept which was developed during the national revival and
progressively evolved during the nineteenth century was that of Czechs’
“democratic exceptionalism.” Czech nationalists in the late nineteenth century
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created this idea of Czech affinity for democracy which later played a role in
legitimizing the Czechoslovak nation-state and acquiring its requested borders.
One way in which history had a positive effect on future events is in democratic
development. As Lonnie Johnson argues in Central Europe, the “destruction of
Bohemia’s feudal nation in the seventeenth century” after the Battle of White
Mountain “contributed to the evolution of a more modern and democratic
Czech political culture in the long run.”38 Recently, scholars of Czech history
have been critical of the “democracy” of Czechoslovakia, calling it a failure
and a farce.

However, Zahra argues that it is necessary to understand the

Czech conception of democracy and not strictly measure it against an
established Western model.
Creation of National Identities & Minorities – Late Austrian Empire
In the late nineteenth century the Habsburg Empire, under the strain of a
large, inefficient bureaucracy, enacted reforms designed to create greater
efficiency throughout the Empire. Thus, the official language of the government
became German which subsequently created a backlash in the Bohemian
lands among the Czech nationalists who believed this to be an infringement on
their historic right. It also began the escalation of the Czech versus German
conflict on the basis of language. Conversely, when Czech became a
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language requirement in schools, German nationalists began accusing
German-speaking officials of “forgetting their completely German origins” for
not opposing this decision.39
As discussed before, this led to competition over “amphibians” and a
gradual radicalization of political positions when faced with an indifferent
population. However, some extremist, or “Germanomaniac,” German-speaking
imperial authorities created a discourse which exacerbated the situation and
caused some Czech nationalists to change their goal from autonomy within the
Empire to independence from the Empire. As a result of the language laws, the
Austro-Hungarian administration ended a situation where being “German”
meant a privileged place among the elites and a part of the government. On
the contrary, it created a space for non-German nationalists outside the
government which hadn’t existed before.

Therefore, instead of creating a

singular “German” state identity, the Austro-Hungarian Empire exacerbated
existing divisions that helped to bring about its own demise.
Even among Czechs, however, there did not emerge any sort of popular
consensus on what it meant to be Czech or have a Czech identity, which
explains the multitude of figures and symbols associated with the Bohemian
lands. One has to look no further than the myriad of monuments and festivals
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which commemorate a variety of mythologized figures associated with different
visions of national and religious identity.40

Therefore, even Czech identity was

fluid and contested on a variety of different levels as well.
Jews, another minority within the Bohemian lands, did not develop their
own national identity within Bohemia in response to this categorization of
“other.”

Instead they “assimilated into dominant national cultures.”41

Frequently Jews became “Germanized” and took on a German national
identity in addition to the language.42 One of the main reasons for this is due to
the fact that the majority of Jews lived in the cities in the Bohemian lands which
were, until the Industrial Revolution, predominantly German. Unfortunately this
led to resentment among Czech nationalists and a conflation of Jews with
Germans which had disastrous effects later on.
The outbreak of World War I completely changed the rhetoric of Czech
nationalists as will be explored in the next two chapters. The political elites, who
were in exile, including the future president, Masaryk, made the decision to
attempt to establish Czechoslovak independence.

However, he needed to

For more on the issues surrounding Czech attempts to manipulate public space to create a
single vision of the nation-state among Czechs, see Paces, Prague Panoramas; for more on the
issues between Czech and German attempts to mark their public space for national self40
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establish some sort of legitimacy for the new state’s right to exist.

Thus, he

borrowed on nationalist ideas of historic right in order to present his vision of
Czechoslovakia to the Allied powers. In a speech in 1918, remarking on the
significance of the Czechoslovak state, he contended:
The Czechs will not be satisfied with the
concession of national autonomy within an
Austrian federation. They have a historical right
to the independence of the Czech lands
(Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia); they insist on their
right to the independence of the State created
by them. In addition to that, they have a
historical and natural right to union with Slovakia,
so brutally oppressed by the Magyars.43
Therefore, Masaryk applied the argument for historic right to Bohemia,
Moravia, and Silesia. He also includes Slovakia in this new state for strategic
purposes. However, since Slovakia and the Bohemian lands had much different
historical pasts, this argument also had to be made on the basis of ethnic lines.
Nonetheless, the argument for the inclusion of Slovakia manipulated history for
political expedience. As Edvard Beneš, Masaryk’s counterpart in exile in Paris
argued:
The term Czecho-Slovaks, or simply the Czechs,
includes two branches of the same nation:
Czechs and Slovaks” which “have the same
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civilization, the same language and history.44
Not only does this statement exemplify the manipulation of history, but it also
shows a manipulation of ethnicity as he states that all Czechs and Slovaks should
simply be called Czechs.
Ironically, the Czech politicians argued against drawing any ethnic lines
through the Bohemian lands on the rationale that the cities and districts were so
ethnically intermixed that any territorial division of ethnicities would create a
large Czech minority in German lands, which was unacceptable. The Czechs,
however, wished to retain the German, Polish, and Hungarian minorities within
the new Czechoslovak state with certain minority rights guarantees such as
schools in minority languages as well as representation in the new government.45
There was also the hope that Czechs and Germans could live in peace after a
decisive defeat of Germany in the war. Even when these German parts of
Czechoslovakia began to protest in order to remain a province of Austria, the
Czechs refused to give in because “the principle of the integrity of the historic
Bohemian-Moravian frontiers was not negotiable.”46
However, the Czech nationalists made one mistake which cost them their
independence to Nazi Germany in 1938-1939. As Margaret Moore explains in
44
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The Ethics of Nationalism, “appealing to historical links can legitimize claims to
vast areas and many different irredentist claims.”47

Another problem with

historical right which Moore discusses is that the adjudication of competing
claims to a disputed territory depends “on where in history one starts, and whose
history one accepts.”48 This is unfortunately a problem which is still contested
today in numerous areas of the world where national groups or states claim a
particular multiethnic territory. This problem is incredibly difficult to solve when
the argument of historic right was confronted by counter-claims of an ethnic
majority, such as in the Czech case of the Sudetenland. Unfortunately, this case
ultimately ended in the forced expulsion of the Germans over contested
historical rights after World War II which created a largely homogenous
Czechoslovakia.
Thus it is obvious that the argument of historic right played a large part in
the Czech’s national awakening, but also in the quest for independence. While
this historic right argument is problematic, it still became part of the national
myth of the Czech people and eventually the state of Czechoslovakia. It also
profoundly affected the immigrants in America who emigrated from Bohemia
whether for economic or political reasons.

These immigrants who worked

tirelessly for the independence of the Czechs and Slovaks are the subject of the
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next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Influence of Immigrant Groups and Personal Connections

In “What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia,”
Herbert Adolphus Miller explains that before United States entry into the First
World War, Americans were largely ignorant of Bohemia and the Czechs. He
further explains that there were only six books in English about Bohemia and the
Czechs up to 1918.49 However, there existed large immigrant communities of
Czechs and Slovaks all over the United States which, once united, caused the
rest of America to take notice. Yet the relationship between the United States
and Czech people actually began in 1848. The Revolution of 1848 not only
“helped Americans discover East Central Europe,” but it also “prompted the first
large Czech and eventual Slovak migrations to America.” 50
An

important

factor

of

American

support

for

Czecho-Slovak

independence during World War I began after Tomáš Masaryk became a well
known public figure. In order to fully understand the legacy of Wilson and his
impact on the memory of Czechs for the creation of Czechoslovakia, it is
necessary to understand the work done by Tomáš Masaryk and Czech49
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American civil society groups to convince Wilson to support an independent
Czechoslovak state.
Tomáš Masaryk began his career as a professor of philosophy at the
University of Prague. His wife, Charlotte Garrigue, was born in Brooklyn and they
were married in New York. He even took her last name and became Tomáš
Garrigue Masaryk.

Later, after visiting the United States again in 1907, he

became convinced that “Czech-Americans were an important part of the
Czech nation and that America could be a source of inspiration for Czech
political life.”51 Masaryk was also influential and well known with Entente circles
as an informant.52

Masaryk had worked previously in the Austrian Reichsrat

(Parliament) as part of the Young Czech movement which was based on the
belief

that

participating

in

the

government

representation as well as Czech political influence.

would

increase

Czech

Later he served in the

Reichsrat again as the founding member of the Realist Party. As a result he was
in the perfect position to supply the Entente powers and their allies with AustroHungarian intelligence as well as provide useful propaganda which the Entente
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used to garner support at home for the war.53
Masaryk’s personal connections also proved immensely useful. Masaryk
was friends with wealthy American businessman Charles Crane who had
important government connections, influence, and money, and valued him as
an “admirable auxiliary for he knew nearly everybody whom Masaryk wanted to
meet and was close to President Wilson.”54

Crane’s friendship proved even

more profitable when, in 1915, Masaryk asked Crane for monetary assistance as
the Czechs worked toward independence from Austria-Hungary. After Czech
independence his son, Richard Crane, became the first United States
ambassador to the newly formed Czechoslovakia. The connection between
these two families doesn’t end there; in 1924, Masaryk’s son Jan Masaryk
married Charles Crane’s daughter, Frances.
Immigrant Influence on United States Policy
The earliest Czech immigrants to America came after 1620; however,
there were very few at first. Most Czech immigrants settled in Chicago, New
York, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Texas Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota,

For more about Masaryk’s personal life and history before his role in Czechoslovak
independence, see Kovtun, Masaryk & America,
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Nebraska Oregon, and California.55 They first formed sokols, gymnasiums, and
began newspapers; however, when World War I broke out, more political
groups emerged. One of the unique advantages of a democracy is the ability
of groups of people to come together for a common cause. Often called civil
society, these independent networks of voluntary associations or groups can
simply hold meetings, or they can attempt to affect changes in policy or their
government.

In Joseph Grady’s work, The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s

Peace Policies, he contends that part of President Wilson’s political philosophy
was that “the people should rule” and thus he “welcomed pressure from the
people.”56 Therefore, ambitious immigrant groups felt that it would be fruitful if
they lobbied the U.S. president and government on behalf of their mother
countries.
According to Nancy G. Ford in Americans All!: Foreign Born Soldiers in
World War I, “ethnic leaders saw their peoples’ participation in the fighting as a
way of demonstrating loyalty to their adopted country and bringing liberation
and independence to their homeland.”57 This was exactly the philosophy of the
Czech and Slovak immigrants in forming these groups and working for their
55

For more on early Czech immigration, see Joseph Chada, The Czechs in the United States

(Washington D.C.: SVU Press, 1981).
56

Joseph P. O’Grady, “Introduction,” in The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s Peace Policies,

ed. Joseph P. O’Grady (The University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 4.
57

Nancy G. Ford, Americans All!: Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I (Bryan-College Station:

Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 28.

40

homelands’ independence.

As Otakar Odlozilik points out, “the Czechs [in

America] engaged in little political activity before 1914,” thus a majority of these
political groups were formed as a response to the war and the prospect of
Czecho-Slovak independence.58 United States entry into the war caused these
immigrants to join the United States military and fight against who they viewed
as Bohemia’s true oppressors, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. To a large extent,
this proved to be a useful venture and helped bring about Czech
Independence. However, volunteering to serve in the United States army was
not the most important factor but part of a larger phenomenon of émigré
political influence on emerging Czech-American relations.

It’s also worth

mentioning that a majority of the immigrants who joined the United States
military did so in order to prove their loyalty to their new country and its allies
since technically they were fighting against the state from which they came, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.59
These Czech civil society groups in America adopted the expressed goal
of bringing about Czech independence after the outbreak of World War I.60
When the war broke out these groups formed to offer support to their fellow
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Slavs, the Serbs, or to provide relief in the form of contributions to the Serbian
Red Cross. There also emerged a number of Slovak groups which had the same
purposes as the Czech.

The first large Czech group which called for

independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire formed the Bohemian
National Alliance in Cleveland in March 1915; however, its headquarters were
located in Chicago. These two cities had the largest concentration of Czechs in
America, so it made sense that this is where the movement began.
The Czech and Slovak immigrant groups began to work together for the
larger goal of independence of Slavic nations in Austro-Hungarian held
territories. The Cleveland Pact, between the Slovak League of America and the
Bohemian National Alliance, in October 1915 stated the goal of these two
groups were for Czecho-Slovak independence.61 Other groups existed which
also promoted Czech and/or Slovak interests in America such as the National
Alliance of Catholic Czechs, the Czech National Federation, the First Slovak
Evangelical League, the National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics, to name a
few.
These groups also created organizations such as the Czech-Slav Press
Bureau with the expressed goal of garnering support for Czecho-Slovak
independence as well as putting out propaganda about the evils of the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire, and the Czechoslovak Relief Council which later became
known as the Czechoslovak Red Cross. There were also newspapers such as the
Bohemian Review, which kept Czechs and Slovaks informed of critical events of
the war as well as independence efforts in America and abroad. In addition,
Czech groups in other countries became active in the independence
movement as well.62 It is important to mention that Czech and Slovak émigré
and exile communities in London and Paris also proved influential in lobbying
Western governments for Czecho-Slovak independence.63
Perhaps the most influential of all the Czech-American émigré groups was
the Czechoslovak National Council of America (CNCA), formed in 1917.

It

consisted of three groups, the Bohemian National Alliance, the Slovak League of
America, and the Czech Catholics. The CNCA lobbied Washington for Czech
and Slovak independence.

Czech- and Slovak-Americans even donated

money to the Czecho-Slovak independence cause.
What raised the status of the CNCA was the establishment of invaluable
contacts with Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa, Representative Adolph J.
Sabath of Chicago, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, diplomat and presidential
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advisor Colonel Edward House, and State Department chief of the Near Eastern
Division Dr. Albert Putney. When Masaryk arrived in the United States in 1918, he
benefited greatly from all the networking already done in this area by the
CNCA.

The CNCA lobbied these important people on behalf of an

independent Czecho-Slovak state and, while it is unclear how much these
contacts helped in the independence effort, it is clear that they helped United
States decision-makers become aware of and familiar with the issue at hand.
Masaryk and Independence
In May of 1918, Masaryk travelled to Chicago in order to get American
support, and Charles Pergler was appointed from the Bohemian Alliance to
become Masaryk’s secretary. Pergler wrote about this time later in his book
America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence. One of the most
influential meetings of the CNCA began that same month when Masaryk met
with its members and together they drafted the Pittsburgh Agreement.

This

document became the basis for Czecho-Slovak independence and the
Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence which occurred later in October.
Finally on June 19th, 1918, Masaryk met with Wilson.

Much of the

conversation centered on whether or not the Czech Legion in Siberia could be
used against the Russian Bolsheviks.

Thus, another important factor in the

Western support of the Czechoslovak position was the role of the Czech military
44

forces. Czech forces, unlike those of other Austrian Empire nationalities, were
militarily effective and well organized so that the “bargaining position of the
Czechs was improved by their military contribution to the Allies.”64 Other Slavic
soldiers in the armies of the Central Powers refused to fight the Czechs and
would actually desert their regiments when faced with Czech soldiers; therefore,
the Allies began to use the Czechs toward the end of the war. However, the
key influential factor proved to be the Czech Legions, which had been awaiting
evacuation from Siberia but remained available in case of the necessity of
Allied intervention in the Russian civil war. In addition, they carried out missions
for the Allies such as holding the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Beneš viewed the

Legions in Siberia as “an asset which could be used to secure definite
recognition of Czechoslovak political and territorial aspirations.”65 Therefore, the
potential use of Czech military forces proved invaluable in attaining Allied
political support for a Czechoslovak state.66
Interestingly, this army recognized the Czecho-Slovak CNCA in the United
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States as its political and military authority when acting in the region.67 However,
Masaryk was opposed to the idea of using the Czech Legions against the
Bolsheviks and encouraged Wilson and Lansing to utilize Japanese intervention
instead. Masaryk did not know what Wilson hoped to accomplish with only
50,000 or 100,000 troops.68 Yet, these troops succeeded in controlling parts of
the Trans-Siberian Railway. While Masaryk preferred a Japanese option, Wilson
still favored using the Czech troops.69
The United States government believed that the announcement of
support for the Czechs in May of 1918 would encourage the Czechs in America
to support the United States in World War I.70 However, the Czechs already
actively supported the Allied war effort, mostly as a means to end imperial rule
of their homeland. As a result of all of these activities, on October 18th, 1918,
Masaryk released the Declaration of Czechoslovak independence and one
month later he was elected the first President of Czechoslovakia.

Ironically,

Masaryk became President of Czechoslovakia while still in Washington D.C. The
Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence, written in the United States in
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English, even had Woodrow Wilson’s name in it.
We accept the democratic principles of America
and France; we accept the American principles
as laid down by President Wilson: the principles of
liberated mankind – of the actual equality of
nations – and of governments deriving all their
just powers from the consent of the governed.71
Aviel Roshwald states that Masaryk is “the most striking example of how
war-time exiles in the Allied countries could propel a hitherto respected but
relatively powerless figure into the seat of power.”72 Masaryk was a well known
educator, intellectual, and politician in Bohemia before the war; however, no
one would have thought at the time he would be the first president or leader of
an independent Czechoslovakia. His work with the Allied leaders, especially
Wilson, and with immigrant and émigré groups in the West, especially those in
the United States, gained him the political fame which awarded him this
distinguished position.
In the national myth of the creation of Czechoslovakia, Masaryk is given
credit for “converting Wilson to an anti-Austrian policy.”73 Masaryk himself later
contended that he and Czechs abroad were responsible for Wilson’s support of
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Czech independence.
Thus I was able, step by step, to persuade the
President and Mr. Lansing to accept [Czech
independence]. But this was by no means the
result of my personal influence alone. The work
and propaganda of our people won us public
goodwill – and Austria-Hungary lost it.74
It is important to note, as several historians have pointed out, Masaryk didn’t
singlehandedly persuade Wilson to accept Czechoslovak independence. There
were other factors such as the Czech Legion in Siberia, which will be discussed in
Chapter Three. However, this became part of the national myth and political
discourse on Czech independence. Thus, this idea of Wilson as defender of the
Czechs is also based on the myth that he was won over to their worthy cause by
Masaryk, which became the basis for the idea of Masaryk and Wilson as twin
champions of Czech independence.
This

view

of

Masaryk

and

Wilson

as

co-champions

of

Czech

independence was accepted by the United States government as well. This is
evident when looking at the1968 document, Background Materials Designed for
Use in the Preparation of Statements and Speeches Commemorating
Czechoslovak Independence Day (October 23rd) and the Birthday of Czech
President Tomáš Masaryk (March 7), found in the Library of Congress:
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In the summer of 1918, Masaryk conferred with
President Wilson and effectively laid the
groundwork for full American support for the
Czechoslovak cause of national independence.
On July 8, Beneš sent a letter to Prague in which
he elaborated on the extent of American
support. ‘Masaryk is in America,’ he wrote. ‘He
has spoken several times with Wilson, and informs
me that our cause has been won so completely
that Wilson and the American government have
promised not to make any fundamental
decisions on Austro-Hungarian affairs without us
or without our approval.75
Therefore, it is evident that this myth of Wilson and Masaryk is actually
proliferated by both the Czech and American governments beyond simply the
creation of Czechoslovakia.

Library of Congress, Background Materials Designed for Use in the Preparation of Statements
and Speeches Commemorating Czechoslovak Independence Day (October 23rd) and the
75
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Chapter 3
Self-Determination: Wilson’s Policies Toward the Czechs During and After World
War I

It is important to understand that the principle of self-determination was
one part of Wilson’s broader foreign policy worldview. According to Gordon
Levin in Woodrow Wilson and World Politics,” Wilson’s goal was to “create an
international civil society” by “Americanizing” the rest of the world thus “creating
a world society under law, to be preserved through the moral and material
strength of the international social contract embodied in the League of
Nations.”76 Therefore, Wilson wanted to create a democratic, peaceful, stable
world. He believed that in order to create this new stable democratic world,
there must be a free flow of ideas and commerce across national boundaries.
These ideas culminated in the League of Nations in which Wilson as the
“fulfillment of his long effort to use America’s moral and material power to move
the world from a warlike state of nature to an orderly global society governed
by liberal norms.”77 The final piece to Wilson’s worldview was self-determination.
In elaborating the principle of self-determination of nations Woodrow
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Wilson stated, “Every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which
they shall live.”78 Wilson came from an International Relations school of thought
which today is called idealism and is known for looking at the world the way it
ought to be according to Western liberal ideas as well as emphasizing
cooperation among like-minded nations.

While his contemporaries were

skeptical of Wilson, the application of his idealism to foreign policy today has
caused some scholars and practitioners to claim that he was ahead of his time.
Henry Kissinger even stated, “Wilsonianism has survived while history has
bypassed the reservation of his contemporaries.”79
Ben Rosamond states that the idealist emphasizes the “perfectibility of
humanity and the virtues of collective security, postnational systems for peace
and the advocacy of international organisations.”80

As an idealist, Wilson’s

principle of self-determination conforms to contemporary liberal internationalism
theory which focuses on morality and cooperation in international politics. One
could even argue that the Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia into the Czech
Republic and Slovakia was a direct result of the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and
his policies of self-determination.

However, this is a topic for another work.

Nevertheless, it is from this school of thought that we can understand Wilson’s
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moral, idealistic vision of American foreign relations as it took shape during World
War I.
Wilson’s ideas didn’t occur spontaneously and independently. As Betty
Miller Unterberger explains, we must understand self-determination in the
American context as it developed over time.81

Therefore it is imperative to

briefly examine self-determination as expressed in the United States experience.
The colonies in North America began as an expression of self-determination.
Europeans who wanted to get away from oppressive rulers came to American
shores in order to have the right to “determine their own political destiny.”82 The
American Revolution occurred as a continuation of this belief in the right of a
people to govern themselves.

Essentially, America was founded on the

principle of self-determination, although it wasn’t called that explicitly at the
time. Thomas Jefferson stated it best when he said, “We surely cannot deny to
any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that everyone
may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change those
forms at its own will.”83
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The idea of self-determination in America changed as the United States
government began to get involved in more foreign entanglements. Therefore,
President Millard Fillmore proclaimed that if America truly believed in selfdetermination, it should stay out of other nation’s affairs. The American Civil War
further cemented the government’s non-interventionist policies as the Union
rejected any foreign intervention in the conflict; however, as the Confederacy
claimed the principle of self-determination in its rebellion it became a
problematic stance.

Self-determination of nations became an idea that

America expressed, but not as a foreign policy goal that would cause the
government to act.84

Wilson and Czecho-Slovak Self-Determination
Wilson didn’t feel that the tenets of self-determination expressed in the
Declaration of Independence were “merely a statement of political ideals but
also a program for action.”

Wilson believed that self-determination “meant
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government by consent of the governed – a moral necessity.”85 Yet, Wilson
didn’t define the concept or its application; he also came to realize the
complications in applying this idea to foreign policy during the postwar peace
conferences.

Even for contemporaries, Wilson’s idea of self determination

proved difficult to define: “When the President talks about ‘self-determination’,
what has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?
Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is
dangerous to peace and stability.”86
Allen Lynch also argues that Wilson didn’t have much knowledge of East
Central Europe when he made speeches about self-determination and
positioned it among his Fourteen Points, which he came to realize at the Paris
Peace Conference.87 Later, Wilson had to make good on certain promises that
otherwise wouldn’t have been made if not for the war. First, however, he had to
come to the decision to dissolve Austria-Hungary, a decision that didn’t occur
as early or have as much support as Czech nationalists previously believed.
It is well documented that Wilson did not want to dissolve the AustroHungarian Empire, and he worked secretly with the Habsburgs in order to try to
bring them to the peace table in order to isolate Germany. Despite the work of
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the immigrant groups in the United States as well as Masaryk, Wilson wasn’t
ready to commit to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Only when these secret
talks fell through in the fall of 1918 did Wilson begin to seriously consider openly
supporting the Czechs and Slovaks in their independence aims.
Although Wilson still wasn’t set on Austro-Hungarian dissolution, as soon as
he stated “that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under
which they shall live,” he became the unwitting champion of the Czechs and
Slovaks who argued for independence.88

On January 10th, 1917, the Allied

powers stated their war goals, which included “the liberation of Italians, of Slavs,
of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination.”89

Yet, the

Americans, not yet a belligerent, still hoped for peace with Austria-Hungary in
order to isolate Germany and end the war.
In Wilson’s June 14th 1917, Flag Day Address, he recognized the Czechs in
Bohemia as a people who didn’t want to be part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and wish to “direct their own affairs” and will only be satisfied by
“undisputed independence.”90 Even here, he didn’t acknowledge the AustroHungarian Empire as the oppressors of the Bohemians, but rather Germany
which used Austria-Hungary and all its minority groups to its advantage in the
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war. In December of 1917, when asking for a declaration of war from Congress,
Wilson stated:
[W]e do not wish in any way to impair or to
rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no
affair of ours what they do with their own life,
either industrially or politically.
We do not
purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way.
We only desire to see that their affairs are left in
their own hands, in all matters, great or small.91
Immigrant groups responded by lobbying their liaisons in the government,
stepping up their propaganda efforts, as well as volunteering for the United
States Military. Even if they weren’t able to join as a result of immigrant status,
many joined the Czechoslovak Army on the Western Front.92
On January 8th, 1918, Wilson delivered to Congress the famous Fourteen
Points Speech of which Point Ten became the beacon of hope for Czechs and
Slovaks living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and abroad. Point Ten stated
that “The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place we wish to see safeguarded
and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous
development.”93 Yet as both Allen Lynch and Betty Miller Unterberger have
pointed out, this was not actually applying the principle of self-determination to
91
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the ethnic groups in the empire. Instead it is calling for greater autonomy in a
true federation of Austria-Hungary.94 Even so, Wilson became overwhelmed by
the sheer number of ethnic groups which expressed their wishes for selfgovernment as a result of his declarations on self-determination. He stated:
When I gave utterance to those words, I said
them without a knowledge that nationalities
existed, which are coming to us day after day….
You do not know and cannot appreciate the
anxieties that I have experienced as the result of
many millions of people having their hopes raised
by what I have said.95
On May 29th, 1918, Robert Lansing announced that the “nationalistic
aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest
sympathy of [the United States] government.”96 In the fall of 1918, Wilson finally
conceded to dismantling the already disintegrating Austria-Hungary and
referred to the empire as “an old building whose sides has been held together
by props.”97 This had more to do with the fact that ethnic groups all over the
empire began to call for independence and there was nothing the Habsburgs
could do about it at that point. Finally, on October 19th, 1918, President Wilson
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officially declared his support for a Czechoslovak state to Vienna and eventually
stipulated Czech independence as a precondition to the armistice of 1918.
Secretary Lansing expressed Wilson’s support in these terms in a letter to the
Swedish Foreign Minister:
Since [point ten of the fourteen points] was
written and uttered to the Congress of the United
States… the President is no longer at liberty to
accept the mere ‘autonomy’ of these peoples
as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that
they, and not he, shall be the judges of what
action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian
Government will satisfy their aspirations and their
conception of their rights and destiny as
members of the family of nations.98
Even as these events unfolded, Wilson didn’t know a great deal about the
actual situation in East Central Europe. As Allen Lynch explains, Wilson began to
realize the “complexities of actually implementing the idea of national selfdetermination in East-Central Europe” which caused him to “express significant
reservations about the concept himself.”99 He even stated,
When I gave utterance to those words [that all nations
had a right to self-determination], I said them without a
knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming
to us day after day… You do not know and cannot
appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as
the result of many millions of people having their hopes
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raised by what I have said.100

As a result, when the Paris Peace Conference began, Wilson and the Americans
began to withdraw from actual decision-making with regards to issues of selfdetermination, and a new champion, France, stepped up its support for a
Czechoslovak state. Yet Czechoslovakia still based a majority of its territorial
arguments on Wilson’s principle of self-determination and, as a result, the idea of
Wilson as its champion lives on.
As a result of Czechoslovak independence, the Czechs and Slovaks
believed that Wilson was their liberator.101 Yet, President Wilson told Charles
Pergler: “By your conduct throughout the war, especially by your armies, you
have demonstrated that you insist upon complete independence. WE have
merely recognized an accomplished fact.”102 Wilson thus gave the immigrant
groups credit for Czech independence as a result of their efforts to make
contacts in Congress and organize speeches an sway American public opinion
on the matter of Czecho-Slovak independence.

However, independence

wasn’t the only goal of the Czech diplomats; next they had to secure the
borders of the new state, which proved equally as difficult as gaining American
100
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support for independence.

Border Disputes and Minorities Within Czechoslovakia
As the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up at the conclusion of World War I,
several states emerged in Eastern Europe along ethnic lines, basing their claims
on President Woodrow Wilson’s policy of self-determination. However, ethnic
boundaries were not clear from the start and, as a result, border disputes over
former Austro-Hungarian territory emerged. In the 1921 Czechoslovak census,
which

used

mother

tongue

as

a

basis

for

determining

nationality,

Czechoslovakia contained a combined ethnic minority population of 34.49% of
the total population.103 A large portion of these minorities, with the exception of
ethnic Germans, lived in contested areas of Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia. In
Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and Slovaks only made up about 65 percent of the
country’s total population; therefore, it became more effective to use historical
and linguistic arguments to establish borders as opposed to demographic
ones.104

103

Joseph S. Roucek, “Czechoslovakia and her Minorities,” in Czechoslovakia Twenty Years of

Independence, ed. Robert J Kerner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940), 174. This
chapter contains an excellent table which, based on census records, shows nationalities living in
Czechoslovakia in 1910, 1921, and 1930.
104 Stephen Borsody, The New Central Europe: Triumphs and Tragedies (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), 3.

60

After World War I, the new Czechoslovak state began again to use
historical arguments to justify border claims. However, while the border regions
they claimed had, in fact, historically been a part of the Bohemian crownlands,
they had since been settled by non-Czechs. Like Czechoslovakia, “many of the
‘new’ states in the region wanted their ‘old’ borders to be reestablished, and
this objective became a source of conflict among neighbors, because the
historical borders either had been fluid throughout the ages or did not
correspond to national borders in the ethnic sense of the word.”105
Predominantly
Deutsch-Böhmen,

German-speaking

and

provinces

Deutsch-Sudmähren

such

became

as

part

Sudetenland,
of

the

new

Czechoslovak state in order to “unite them with the rest of the country and
strengthen Czechoslovak territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference.”106 It
was also argued that the only reason why Germans made up significant
minorities in these provinces was a result of Bohemian nobles’ invitation to
German colonists to work, or German migration to “traditional” Bohemian lands
as a result of White Mountain. Thus, history was put to work again in legitimizing
and justifying border claims and disputes.
Though the Western allies had no clear policy when it came to border
disputes, some had specific agendas.
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Czechoslovak state as a future ally against a common enemy, Germany.
Therefore, the French set out to secure strategically and economically favorable
frontiers for the Czechoslovak state; however, they also wanted a giant buffer
zone, and even a confederation of states made up of Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and Poland. While the United States made sure Czechoslovakia
gained independence; they didn’t have much to do with the actual decisions
on the settlement of borders. The British preferred to remain largely out of the
decision-making on East-Central European borders as they were preoccupied
elsewhere. Thus, the Czechs were free to seize territory which they considered
theirs by historic right as the “territorial limits of the states were determined
piecemeal by the Big Four, who never fitted the fragments together or
considered the influence of their decisions on the political and economic
balance of the area.”107
In order to incorporate Slovakia and Ruthenia, Masaryk and Beneš turned
to Wilson’s principle of self-determination. Masaryk argued that the Slovaks and
Ruthenes wanted to be free of Hungary and be part of the democratic
federation of Czechoslovakia. Ironically, France proved to be the real ally of
Czechoslovakia at Paris, not the United States, and as a result Czechoslovakia
achieved nearly all of its territorial demands.

107

Perman, Czechoslovak State, 75.

62

At the Paris Peace Conference, Beneš argued for Czechoslovak borders
in the north to be based on historical right and economics. In the case of Těšín
(Teschen in German, or Cieszyn in Polish), the Czechs wanted to control the
economically prosperous coal region of Austrian Silesia, which also happened to
correspond to the historic medieval borders of Bohemia-Moravia. Additionally,
Czechoslovakia claimed that the only railway to connect the western part of
the newly formed country with Slovakia was located in the Těšín region.
Unfortunately, this conflict also led to a break-down in relations as well as
hostilities between Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly over their shared
border. Both states had a legitimate argument for the possession of Těšín.
Poland argued that this city had a Polish majority (around 55%), and
Czechoslovakia argued for its strategic importance to the new country as well
as that it had historically belonged to the Bohemian crownlands. Linguistically,
when this area of Silesia was under Habsburg rule, “German served in most
capacities as the administrative language; there were no fixed or obvious
borders of Polish and Czech language and culture in Těšín Silesia.”108
Těšín was also valuable to both countries’ economies due to the presence
of a large urban industrial center surrounded by coalfields as well as a strategic
railway point. Therefore, on January 23rd, 1919, after much dispute about the
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status of the region, Czech troops invaded the Polish portion of Těšín and
captured the city. This resulted in an armed confrontation until February 5th,
1919. Despite Allied involvement, it was still determined that Czechoslovakia
and Poland should solve the dispute themselves; however, neither side was
willing to give up their claim to the entire region. Eventually, despite attempts at
a plebiscite, the Council of Ambassadors, part of the League of Nations for
treaty compliance, decided the border which was signed into effect the Spa
Conference in Belgium in July 1920.
In 1920, the League of Nations determined that the city to the north
belonged to Poland and the coalfields and railway lines to the south belonged
to Czechoslovakia. However, neither side was happy with this resolution since
each lost part of Těšín and both sides claimed the entire region. Sir James Roy,
a British diplomat sent to ensure the peaceful transfer of the city of Těšín to
Poland in 1920, explained that “as to the possibility of rapprochement between
Czech and Pole, this is for the moment impracticable. Both are incapable of
thinking in terms other than local; their vision is circumscribed by urgent
problems of social reconstruction and irritating questions of boundary
delimitation.”109
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Ultimately, Czechoslovakia obtained almost all border claims, including the
majority of the province of Těšín. One way to understand this decision is that
Masaryk and Beneš appealed to the democratic principles that had supposedly
guided the Allies in World War I. Their argument of democratic exceptionalism
and national self-determination on the basis of “historic rights,” coupled with the
Czech émigré communities lobbying key members of the Allied governments
and the League of Nations, resulted not only in the granting of statehood, but
border claims as well. It also helped that the personalities and rhetoric of the
Czech politicians appealed to the Allies.

In Peacemakers: The Paris Peace

Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, Margaret Macmillan explains
the effectiveness of Czech claims to democratic exceptionalism in the eyes of
Entente diplomats:
The Poles were, of course, dashing and brave but
quite unreasonable, the Romanians charming and
clever, but sadly devious, the Yugoslavs, well, rather
Balkan.
The Czechs were refreshingly Western…
Beneš and Masaryk were unfailingly cooperative,
reasonable and persuasive as they stressed the
Czech’s deep-seated democratic traditions and their
aversion to militarism, oligarchy, high finance, indeed
all that the old Germany and Austria-Hungary had
stood for.110
Beneš worked diligently attempting to win over the Allies in Paris. His effort was
rewarded when he sat on the Supreme War Council when no other
110
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representatives of Central or Eastern European states were invited. In the long
run, the main problem with the borders which he secured proved to be the
large ethnic minorities which now resided within the Czechoslovak state.
Ultimately, almost every Czechoslovak border claim was granted;
however, this proved to be a mixed blessing. Gaining the historic Bohemian
lands meant that Czechoslovakia would also gain large and diverse minority
populations which proved to be problematic later. The ethnic minority situation
didn’t change much from Austrian administration to Czechoslovak, except that
now the Czech nationalists were in a position to enact laws which furthered their
Czech-centered goals.

Once again, there didn’t seem to be any room for

autonomy of national minorities, even though Czechs and Slovaks knowingly
pursued borders which would create a multi-ethnic state. However, as Tony
Smith explains, during the inter-war period, the multi-ethnic character actually
helped

contributed

democracy.

to

Czechoslovakia’s

successful

maintenance

of

a

The sheer fact that the Czechs and Slovaks always had to

compromise with each other made it difficult for a single national group to gain
hegemony which helped the plurality of Czechoslovak democracy.111
Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, consciously intended for
Czechoslovakia to be a multi-ethnic state. However, once again the promotion
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of Czech interests above all others as a legacy of the Czech-German conflicts
during the late Habsburg Empire encouraged the exclusion of any other
identities aside from that created by Czech nationalists.

For example, Slovaks

were encouraged to be proud of their heritage; however, it was their invented
“Czech” heritage that was intended.
Increasingly, the Czech government turned to legal means now that they
were available in order to nationalize its citizens and begin the process of
“Czechification.”112 The government sanctioned the migration of Czechs into
predominantly German areas in order to gain a more legitimate foothold in
these German-speaking regions of the new Czechoslovak state. Interestingly
enough, although Germans were recognized as non-Czech, they could still
become Czech just by speaking the language. Thus existed continuity from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire between these two created identities for a sizeable
portion of the population. The situation for Jews didn’t change as a result of the
change in regime. Their association with, and frequent assimilation into German
culture caused Czech nationalists to criticize them and view them as “agents of
Germanization in nationally contested regions.”113
After World War I, comprised of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia,

112

This term is used by Cornwall as an artificial means of national identity, in other words, not a

naturally occurring phenomenon but a forced one; see Cornwall, Language Border, 923.
113

Zahra, Kidnapped Souls, 22.

67

Ruthenia and the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia controlled a pivotal central
location in Europe. Bohemia not only provided the unity necessary to keep
these parts of Czechoslovakia together but seemingly protected the integrity of
Europe as well.

Recognizing Bohemia’s geopolitical significance in the late

nineteenth century, Bismarck declared “whoever is the master of Bohemia is the
master of Europe,” adding that “the boundaries of Bohemia are the safeguard
of European security.”

In his mind “the Czech nation does not lust for

domination” therefore their continued presence in Bohemia protected Europe
from plunging into chaos. Conversely he asserted that any adventurers who
attempted to violate the sovereignty of Bohemia would “plunge Europe into
misery.”114
Bismarck’s statement reigned true in 1938, when the Czechs lost control of
the Sudetenland to Hitler as a result of the Munich Agreement, which paved the
way for the subsequent Nazi takeover of all of Bohemia. Consequently, all of
Europe was plunged into chaos. However, where was this special relationship
between the Czechs and Americans now?

The United States government

explained the situation as follows:
Because of its geographic isolation deep in
Central Europe and the emergence of a
powerful Nazi Germany and Communist Russia
114
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on its borders, Czechoslovakia was never to have
Western support sufficiently strong to guarantee
its national independence and territorial integrity.
Essentially the Czechoslovaks have been left to
fend for themselves in one of the most politically
sensitive areas of Europe.115
Though Otakar Odlozilik is quick to point out that Wilson took much longer
to support the Czecho-Slovak independence aims than other Allied powers, in
fact didn’t matter or register with the Czechs. It also didn’t matter that Wilson
didn’t actively support Czech border claims in Paris.

When Masaryk finally

returned to a newly formed Czechoslovakia as its president he returned to
fanfare and a belief that President Wilson and the United States would always
be the Czechs’ guarantor of independence. Thus began a time period where
portraits of Wilson “were to be seen not only in public buildings along with those
of Masaryk but also in private homes – evidence of the belief that President
Wilson was the best friend of Czechoslovakia, the chief promoter among the
Allies of its interests and aims.”116
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Chapter 4
Case Study: Wilson in Czech Memory and Monumental Politics

In 1923, Masaryk sent the dying Wilson two photo albums with pictures of
all the public places that the Czech people had named for him, such as streets
and squares.

There were postcards commissioned in his honor as well with

images of both Masaryk and Wilson on them (see appendix).

When Wilson

passed away in 1924, the Czechoslovaks held services in his honor in Prague and
Beneš gave a speech about the importance of Wilson to the Czechoslovak
state.117 The biggest honor came in the form of a statue in Prague opposite the
Wilson Railway Station in 1928. What was the meaning and intent behind this
site of memory, and what narrative of the past does this monument represent?
With the vast expansion of the field of memory studies, it is important to be clear
about what one is discussing.
Theory – What Type of Memory?
The type of memory addressed here is collective and takes the form of
political or national memory. Jeffrey Olick explains that “memories… are as
much the products of the symbols and narratives available publicly - and of the
social means of storing and transmitting them - as they are the possessions of
117
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individuals.”118 He then differentiates between two types of memory: collected
and collective.

Collected memory is collectively framed individual memory

attached to experience, since it is understood that individual memory does not
occur in a vacuum; however, collective memory is shared memory which is
detached from personal experience and reattached to an external site, such as
monuments.

Alaida Assmann differentiates memory into individual, social,

political, and cultural categories.

Individual and social memory falls under

Olick’s “collected memory” category, whereas political and cultural memory
falls under his “collective memory” category.

Specifically, Assmann explains

that political memory is “how memories are used for political action and the
formation of group identity” and can be established by certain practices, such
as the erection of monuments, which stabilize this memory in a way that can be
passed on over time.119
Assmann’s categorization of political memory can be further understood
as the process by which political actors use tools and mechanisms to construct
memory and therefore create a national narrative in order to facilitate a
particular national identity construction. This process is what Jan-Werner Müller
refers to as collective national memory which best exemplifies the relationship
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between memory and politics or power. He explains that “memory itself is a
kind of ‘symbolic power’, which can be marshaled in much the same way as
material power.”120 He also establishes two links between memory and power:
legitimacy and interest. This study focuses on legitimacy which is how “policies
are legitimated through appeals to the collective or national memory for social
consumption both at home and abroad.”121

What Müller calls collective

national memory, Duncan Bell calls myth. These myths are “highly simplified
narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected events, people,
and places, real or imaginary.”122 Bell contends that “the forms assumed by
mythscapes,” which can include monuments, “are always the result of power,
and the struggle over interpretation of the past.”123
Furthermore, there are various ways in which this national political memory
can be studied: top-down or bottom-up. According to Assmann, a bottom-up
approach “looks at individuals in specific historical situations, investigating how
memories

are

established and

communicated;” whereas, a

top-down

approach “examines collective units… and asks how memories are used for
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political action and the formation of group identity.”124
When examining this top-down approach, it is important to look at the
landscape or sites where power and identity are negotiated. One such site is
the monument; however, it is important to first make the distinction between
monuments and memorials. Robert Ivy explains that though both monuments
and memorials involve place as well as remembrance, “fundamentally a
monument comprises a designed and constructed physical object intended as
a commemoration;” whereas, memorials “may take on a more ephemeral
form.”125
When discussing landscape and sites of memory O’Keefe distinguishes
between “visual-factual” memories and “sensual-emotional” memories and
posits that the landscape can be “a touchstone for remembering both.”126
“Sensual-emotional” memories can be personal experiences of an event;
whereas “visual-factual” memories can be the external site or political
representation of the event to the public. He explains that memories which
appear or disappear “do not simply emerge out of thin air… but result directly
from people’s commemorative decisions and actions as embedded within and
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constrained by particular sociospatial conditions.”127 Thus, specific memories
can be constructed at certain sites where commemorative action has been
taken.
The Case of the Wilson Monument in Prague: Background and Analysis
On July 4th, 1928, a statue to the American president Woodrow Wilson was
unveiled in Prague opposite the Wilson railway station (seen Figures 2 and 3 in
Appendix). Beneš, the Foreign Minister, stated at the dedication, “our people
understood and appreciated President Wilson and his native land… he was for
a long time their strengthening consolation and hope, their helper and friend,
and today he will be their model of a citizen and a democrat.”128 Americans of
Czechoslovak descent raised the money for the statue and a Czech American,
Albin Polasek, built the statue which was commissioned by the Czechoslovak
National Council of America. It is also worth noting that he built the Masaryk
Memorial in Chicago in 1941.129 At the base of the statue to the deceased
American president, the inscription stated “The world must be made safe for
democracy,” a Wilson quote. On July 4th, 1928 at the unveiling of the statue, the
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Czechoslovak Deputy Premier “spoke of the nation’s gratefulness to Wilson.”130
Massive amounts of Czechs in the newly formed Czechoslovakia turned out at
the unveiling to show their appreciation and enthusiasm for the American
President (see Figure 1 in Appendix). However, the statue didn’t remain in place
for very long and under Nazi occupation this statue was torn down in 1941.
Ironically, Hitler used Wilson’s self-determination rhetoric when arguing for
the Sudetenland before and during the Munich Conference. After taking over
the Sudetenland due to European appeasement policies, Hitler invaded
Czechoslovakia and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
recognizing a separate and truncated Slovak state.

After the United States

formally declared war on Germany December 11th, 1941, the Nazi leader of the
Protectorate, Reinhard Heydrich, had the Wilson statue removed and destroyed
the next day. At the conclusion of World War II, the plaque with its Wilson quote,
however, was placed again where the statue had once stood. Yet again, the
Soviets, another foreign power whose ideals didn’t line up with Wilson removed
the plaque after the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948. In the
1970s, the Czechoslovak communist regime went one step further and ordered
that all the original casts be destroyed.
After the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the founder of
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American Friends of the Czech Republic, Robert Doubek, went to work raising
the funds and searching for the missing original casts which had reportedly been
destroyed by the Czechoslovak communist government during the Cold War.
Miraculously, even after having signed off on destroying the casts, someone
saved the head and buried it in the national archives.131 Thereafter, the new
Czech government paid for the base of the statue, and the American Friends of
the Czech Republic paid for the statue itself. The replica of the original statue
was commissioned in 2009 and unveiled in Prague in 2011. Debbie Komanski,
executive director of the Albin Polasek Museum stated:
It’s an extremely, extremely important symbol of
the friendship between our nations and our
common commitment to making the world safe
for democracy. The Nazis may have destroyed
it, the Soviets took their shot at it, but it will be
unveiled again.132
This statue can be seen as a means to bind Czechoslovakia to the United
States in the memories of the Czechoslovak people in order to create political
legitimacy.

Müller’s link of memory-power to legitimacy is important for

understanding the politics behind the Wilson statue. Not only can policies be
legitimized through memory, but nations and their relations can be legitimized
through memory. In this example, the statue of Wilson in Prague in 1928 not only
131
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serves the purpose of legitimizing the new nation of Czechoslovakia, but also
establishes and legitimizes the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the
United States of America. Its reestablishment in 2011 is a continuation of the
legitimization of the relationship between the newly divorced nation, the Czech
Republic and the United States.

It was especially important to establish a

democratic link to the United States after being a communist-ruled state for the
better part of the late twentieth century. Thus, the constructed political memory
of Wilson’s role in the formation of former Czechoslovakia takes physical form in
this site of his monument.
Why construct this type of monument in Prague?

Sanford Levinson

explains that, “changes in political regime often bring with them changes in the
organization of public space; states always promote privileged narratives of the
national experience and thus attempt to form a particular kind of national
consciousness.”133

The Czech elites of 1928 were attempting to do just this

through a top-down approach where their political actions and legitimacy were
basically legitimized through the Wilson statue; and thus they were the rightful
rulers. While American civil society groups largely funded both versions of the
statue, the Czech government on both occasions agreed to its placement as a
way to nurture good Czech-U.S. relations.
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“monuments participate in establishing the legitimacy and authority of the
state” and are “produced through a process of political negotiations, are
developed into symbols of cultural solidarity.”134

This monument aided in

establishing this legitimacy and served as a reminder of that authority.
The statute also shows how the landscape can be used for political
means in order to further one interpretation of the past, even at the expense of
other interpretations. As Assmann explains, political memory is anchored in the
material.

Therefore, this statue serves as a site of political memory where

“policies are legitimated through appeals to the collective or national memory
for social consumption both at home and abroad.”135 Both in Czechoslovakia,
and later the Czech Republic, as well as in the United States, this statue is a site
which ties the Czech people to the American people. In addition, it connects
the Czechs to the American democratic tradition and the principles which
Wilson held. It also holds special meaning for descendents of Bohemia living in
the United States which see this site of memory as a link to their ancestors’
homeland.
On the other hand, the statue could have been unveiled in 1928 as a
response to the growing uncertainty in the world around them. Indeed, during
the unveiling, sentiments were expressed such as the hope that “Wilson’s
134
135
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idealism would one day be realized despite the war’s aftermath of dictatorships
which prevail in parts of Europe;” and, “as long as the hodgepodge map of
Europe remains as it is, there will always be one little country where nothing but
praise will be said for America’s war-time President.”136 Therefore, this monument
could also serve to bind the Czechoslovak-American relations in the memories
of Americans as well.

There was legitimate fear and uncertainty about the

future of Czechoslovakia, and thus the Czech elites may have attempted to
bind the political memories of these two nations in the hope of future favorable
political action.
Another interesting aspect of the Wilson monument was its removal by
Reinhard Heydrich during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Altering

landscape isn’t just about what kind of political memory to impose, but also
about what kind of memory to forget.

As Levinson explains, “those who

overthrow regimes often take as one of their first tasks the physical destruction of
symbols – and the latent power possessed by these markers – of those whom
they have displaced.”137 Therefore, the removal of the Wilson monument by
Heydrich attests to the actual power of this monument in the Czech politicalnational memory.
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International Relations and Memory?
In a lecture in 2005, the Czech ambassador to the United States, Martin
Palouš, “traced current relations back to the end of the First World War when the
United

States

‘helped

decisively

with

the

creation

of

a

democratic

Czechoslovakia,’ and he continually referenced the need to build upon those
foundations in the pursuit of a continued relationship.”138 Then on September
8th, 2011, a new statue of Wilson was raised in the same location as the old
statue.
At the unveiling of the new statue in 2011, the Czech ambassador to the
United States, Petr Gandalovic stated that the statue is “an opportunity to
commemorate the importance of the United States of America in the creation
of independent Czechoslovakia.”139

Prominent Czech magazines such as

Prague Leaders Magazine, the Prague Monitor, the Prague Post, and Radio
Prague all covered the resurrection of the statue and its subsequent unveiling.
Prague Leaders Magazine even placed a clip of the unveiling and the
weeklong festivities surrounding the event on its YouTube channel.140
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interesting thing about the 2011 unveiling of the Wilson statue on YouTube is that
it shows the popular enthusiasm and large crowds which appeared for the
statue’s unveiling. As a result of its presence on the internet, this production and
interpretation of the past won’t go away any time soon.
The United States Embassy in Prague also posted a clip on YouTube of
Ambassador Norman Eisen speaking at the unveiling in which he states that the
statue is “not only a physical structure, but also a monument in [the Czech
people’s] hearts.”141 He goes on to state that the monument is indicative of the
close ties between the United States and the Czech Republic and symbolizes
the many immigrants from Bohemia to the United States.

Essentially,

Ambassador Eisen enumerates the myth of the statue and the political-symbolic
importance for both the Czech peoples and the American peoples today. Thus
this resurrected statue of Wilson is furthering the myth of the creation of
Czechoslovakia and the myth of Wilson in the Czech Republic itself as well as
presents the Czech Republic as a distinctly Western state which is perpetuated
by both the Czech government and immigrant groups in the United States.
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As Müller states, “memory is not a vessel of truth or a mirror of interests, but
a process of constructing meaning.”142 This meaning can take a variety of forms
such as monuments and can be a place where nationhood is legitimized and
national-identity is constructed and shared. It can also be a place to attempt
to influence relationships between countries by linking the two based on shared
democratic values and historical circumstances. The Wilson statue is a site of
ongoing political and national memory construction with numerous layers which
are as telling about Czech national identity and politics as they are about
Czech-American foreign relation strategies.
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Conclusion and Consequences for Today

The communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 marked the beginning
of another chapter in Czech-American relations; however, it proved to be much
more limited than before. The CNCA was initially active in lobbying the United
States government to liberate Czechoslovakia from the communists. Yet the
émigré organization began to disintegrate shortly thereafter due to infighting as
to what course of action the Council should take.

A much smaller Council

began to help Czech expatriates find places in the United States to live and
work.

This phase consisted mostly of Czech-Americans financially helping

Czechs who wanted to leave their now communist-ruled country.
There were still other civil society groups of Czech descent in the United
States, some of which exist in the present; what follows are just a few of the
many. The American Fund for Czechoslovak Relief (AFoCR) was established in
1948 to provide aid and relief to Czechoslovakia during communism. This group
terminated its activities in 1990. The American Friends of the Czech Republic
(AFoCR) states on the website that its mission is to: “foster[] closer ties between
the United States and the Czech Republic in the areas of business, trade,
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culture, education, diplomacy, and security.”143

This organization was also

responsible for building the Masaryk Memorial in Washington, D.C., the reerection of the Wilson Statue in Prague, as well as financially assisting the Czech
Republic after the floods of 2002.

It also supported the entry of the Czech

Republic into NATO.
The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, formed in 1949, became the Czech
and Slovak Solidarity Council in 1994 after the Velvet Divorce to promote good
relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. The Wilsonian Club, founded in 1949
by Czech- and Slovak-Americans originally commemorated the memory and
legacy of Wilson in his part of the independence of Czechoslovakia. Today its
goal is to commemorate his legacy all over the world.
Aside from these groups, there has been collaboration between the
Czech Republic and the United States on several occasions.

Politically, the

Czech Republic was a staunch supporter of the United States during the Iraq
invasion and during the war on terror. Most recently, a fertilizer plant exploded
in the town of West, Texas.

Devastated by the explosion, West, inhabited

primarily by people of Czech descent, was initially denied FEMA assistance.
As a result of the destruction, the Czech Republic stepped in to help by
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approving the donation of $200,000 to the town of West.

The Czech

ambassador to the United States, Petr Gandalovič “travelled to West
immediately after the explosion to personally express his condolences to those
affected by the blast.”144 He even remarked that in the Czech Republic, “this
story is the NO.1 news item and tops social media discussions.”145 It is easy to
see how, to this day, the legacy and memory of Czech-American cooperation
based on Wilson and Czech immigrants still permeates the relationship between
these two nations.
In the end, the words of President Tomáš Masaryk still ring true in the
Czech Republic:
Your name, Mr. President, as you have no doubt
read, is openly cheered in the streets of Prague –
our nation will forever be grateful to you and to
the people of the United States. And we know
how to be grateful. Believe me, Mr. President,
Yours very sincerely. Th. G. Masaryk146
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World War I, established the United States president’s role in the creation of
Czechoslovakia regardless of any misgivings he may have had during the
process. The success of the Czech nationalists and Czech immigrant civil society
groups in using historic right to achieve foreign and domestic policy aims is
unique; however, the legacy of Woodrow Wilson as he lives on in Czech politics
is also exceptional in history. This legacy can be seen through the case of the
Wilson Monument in Prague and its resilience as a symbol of democratic
freedom

to

the

Czech

people.

86

Appendix

Figure 1 - Czech crowds at the original Wilson statue’s unveiling in 1928.147
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Figure 2 - 2011 Wilson statue in Prague148

Figure 3 - 2011 Wilson statue in Prague149

Figure 4 - Tomáš Masaryk and Woodrow Wilson on a Czech postcard (Personal
Collection)
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Figure 5 - Woodrow Wilson and Tomáš Masaryk on a Czech postcard (Personal
Collection)

Figure 6 - Tomáš Masaryk and Woodrow Wilson on a Czech postcard
commemorating the relationship between the newly formed Czechoslovakia
and the United States. (Personal Collection)
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Figure 7 - Woodrow Wilson and family on a Czech postcard (Personal Collection)

Figure 8 - Edward Benes and Tomáš Masaryk on a Czech postcard after the Nazi
takeover of the Czech Republic (Personal Collection)
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Figure 9 - Tomáš Masaryk (Personal Collection)
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Figure 10 - Tomáš Masaryk as a young man (Personal Collection)
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Figure 11 - Tomáš Masaryk (Personal Collection)
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